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ABSTRACT
Aims To evaluate the impact of the 2011 Scottish ban on multi-buy promotions of alcohol in retail stores. Design
and setting Difference-in-differences analysis was used to estimate the impact of the ban on the volume of alcohol
purchased by Scottish households, comparedwith those in England andWales, between January 2010 and June 2012.
Participants A total of 22 356 households in Scotland, England and Wales. Measurements Records of alcohol
purchasing from each of four categories (beer and cider, wine, spirits and flavoured alcoholic beverages), as well as total
volume of pure alcohol purchased. Findings Controlling for general time trends and household heterogeneity, there
was no significant effect of the multi-buy ban in Scotland on volume of alcohol purchased either for the whole
population or for individual socio-economic groups. There was also no significant effect on those who were large
pre-ban purchasers of alcohol. Most multi-buys were for beer and cider or for wine. The frequency of shopping trips
involving beer and cider purchases increased by 9.2% following the ban (P < 0.01), while the number of products
purchased on each trip decreased by 8.1% (P < 0.01). For wine, however, these effects were not significant.
Conclusions Banning multi-buy promotions for alcohol in Scotland did not reduce alcohol purchasing in the short
term. Wider regulation of price promotion and price may be needed to achieve this.
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INTRODUCTION
Alcohol consumption is a major cause of ill health and
is the third leading cause of morbidity and mortality
in Europe, after tobacco and high blood pressure [1].
Excessive alcohol consumption also has major social
and economic consequences: estimates put the number
of alcohol-related violent crimes at close to 1 million in
England and Wales in 2010–11 [2]; in England alone
the total annual cost of alcohol-related harm to the
National Health Service (NHS) was estimated at £3.5
billion in 2009–10 [3]. In light of the heavy burden
resulting from excessive alcohol consumption, there
is widespread recognition of the need to tackle the
problem [4].
A substantial body of evidence points to price inter-
ventions, e.g. alcohol taxation, as the most effective and
cost-effective means of reducing consumption and asso-
ciated harm [5]. However, such measures have not thus
far attracted strong public or political support, due possi-
bly to scepticism about their effectiveness and ideological
aversion to what could be seen as paternalistic inter-
ference [6–8]. Industry lobbying may also play a role [9].
Limiting certain price promotions of alcohol products
appears to be less contentious and might still go some
way towards reducing purchasing, given that price pro-
motions temporarily reduce the unit price of alcohol
which—other things being equal—should increase pur-
chasing [10,11]. In addition, there is evidence from
studies of processed foods suggesting that multi-buy
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promotions—also called quantity discounts—promote
stockpiling and, given their increased availability,
increase consumption [12]. Such an effect might
plausibly also occur for alcohol [13,14].
However, it might be that the industry would respond
to potential revenue-reducing effects of limiting multi-
buy promotions by simply replacing these with other
forms of promotion, such as simple price reductions.This,
in turn, could counteract the intended effects of the
restriction, or even make alcohol more affordable.
The Scottish government became the first in the
United Kingdom to attempt to influence alcohol purchas-
ing by banning one particular type of alcohol promotion,
multi-buy promotions, in ‘off-trade’ stores from October
2011 onwards as part of the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act
2010. Off-trade stores cover high street retail outlets
including supermarkets, off-licences and convenience
stores which sell alcohol for consumption off the premises
(which accounts for 68% of pure alcohol sold in the
United Kingdom in 2012 [15]), but not sales in pubs, bars
and restaurants. More specifically, the Act specified that
‘A package containing two or more alcoholic products
(whether of the same or different kinds) may only be sold
on the premises at a price equal to or greater than the
sum of the prices at which each alcoholic product is for
sale’ [16]. Note that ‘product’ refers to Stock Keeping
Unit, a unique code that embodies all attributes such as
size, colour and packaging (including multi-packing).
Examples of banned offers include ‘buy-one-get-one-free’
and ‘two for £8’ offers. The Act also involved other regu-
lations, including a restriction of in-store alcohol display
and a revised age verification policy, which needs to be
borne in mind when considering the impact of the legis-
lation. In this paper we provide the first in-depth evalua-
tion of the short-term impact of this legislation on
purchasing, using detailed consumer panel data from
22 356 UK households.
METHODS
Data
Alcohol purchasing data from Kantar WorldPanel’s
Household panel (http://www.kantarworldpanel.com)
from January 2010 to June 2012 were used in the analy-
sis. Compared to other data sources (including the Scot-
tish Household Survey and the Living Costs and Food
Survey), the Kantar WorldPanel Household data provide
richer information about purchasing behaviour (e.g.
larger sample size, longer study duration and more fre-
quent observations) and have recently been used increas-
ingly by academic research [17–19]. In addition, they
were the only data available at the time of conducting
the analysis.
The data comprise records of the take-home pur-
chases of a sample of 22 356 households living in the
United Kingdom. The variables include the volume of
alcohol purchased in four categories: (i) beer and cider;
(ii) wine; (iii) spirits; and (iv) flavoured alcoholic
beverages (FABs), as well as detailed information
on household-specific characteristics, including socio-
economic status and region of residence.
The panel was set up by the data company by inviting
households to join the panel via letter or e-mail, with
addresses obtained from mailing lists. Vouchers from
high street retailers or vouchers for leisure and days-out
are offered as compensation for participation in the
panel (the average reward was about £100 per house-
hold per year). The UK Office of National Statistics (ONS)
census information and the UK Broadcasters’ Audience
Research Board (BARB) Establishment survey were used
to define the target population. A stratified sampling
method was used, with stratum variables being region
(six regions in the United Kingdom), household size and
age of main shopper.
The panel households are required by the data
company to record all purchases brought back to their
homes using barcode scanners, and also to send digital
images of till receipts to the company. Households are
included in the data set only if they provide data to a
satisfactory degree in the first 2 months. The quality of
data sent by the households (e.g. scanning compliance) is
monitored continuously and maintained throughout the
survey periods by the data company. For further details on
the data used see Supporting information, section 1.
Starting from the raw Kantar WorldPanel Household
panel data we constructed a household-level panel data
set measuring the volume of alcohol purchased before
and after the Scottish ban (which started on 1 October
2011). Households that joined or dropped out from the
panel during the survey period were included in the
analysis if they were present for at least one quarter
before and after the ban (July 2011–December 2011).
Research design
We evaluated the impact of the ban of multi-buy promo-
tions on the volume of alcohol purchased in Scotland by
using a difference-in-differences analysis [20–23], with
English and Welsh households, which were not exposed
to the legislation, as the control group. The difference-in-
differencesmethod compares the difference in the volume
of alcohol purchased by Scottish households in pre- and
post-ban periods with the same difference observed in the
control group (English and Welsh households). The
design is recommended, for example, by the Magenta
Book [23] in evaluating policies in an observational
setting.
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The difference-in-differences method relies crucially
on the assumption that, in the absence of legislation, time
trends in the volume of alcohol purchased are the same
in both groups, as any significant baseline difference
in trends may lead to spurious findings. A ‘placebo’
difference-in-differences analysis was therefore con-
ducted to check for baseline differences using data from
the previous year (January 2010–June 2011), with a
hypothetical ban in October 2010, for which no ‘effect’
was expected. The methods underlying this ‘difference-
in-difference-in-differences’ analysis [24] are described in
more detail in the Supporting information, section 2.
Analyses were conducted separately for the four
alcohol categories, as well as for total pure alcohol, to
examine the overall effects across categories. It is impor-
tant to note that beer or cider and wine account for by far
the biggest volume of sales via multi-buys (see Support-
ing information Table S1-1 and S1-2). Therefore we
expect that most, if any, of the effects of the policy will be
concentrated in these categories. The volume of pure
alcohol is defined by the aggregated volume of alcohol
purchased from the four categories, weighted using
average alcohol by volume (ABV) of each category [25].
It should be noted that, as average ABV is applied, the
analysis of pure alcohol does not account for potential
substitution between higher and lower ABV products
within a given alcohol category.
Because we were interested primarily in the purchas-
ing behaviour of regular purchasers, we restricted our
sample to households which had purchased alcohol
at least once in the pre- and post-ban periods. This
excluded never or very occasional purchasers, as has
been conducted in comparable analyses [26] (details in
Supporting information Table S2-1 to S2-5). We applied
a logarithm transformation to normalize the highly
skewed and long-tailed distribution of the raw volume of
alcohol purchased [26–28] (see Supporting information
Figs S1 and S2).
The analyses were conducted within a regression-
based framework. The treatment effect was estimated by
least-squares with household-level fixed effects (i.e.
within-household estimation). Therefore, our estimates
are robust to any household level heterogeneity which
does not vary in the short term, such as household size,
education and region of residence (Supporting informa-
tion section 2). The estimation of standard errors takes
into account the sampling stratification using cluster-
robust standard errors, which allows for within-stratum
correlation and for heteroskedasticity [29]. The analyses
were conducted using Stata SE version 11.2.
Subsample analyses
We conducted two subsample analyses:
1 testing for differential effects by socio-economic status,
splitting the sample into three groups according to the
UK Registrar General’s social classes, based on occupa-
tion (advantaged: professional or higher managerial;
middle: skilled non-manual or skilled manual; less
advantaged: semi-skilled or unskilled manual) [30];
and
2 exploring the effects on households purchasing
‘higher’ volumes of alcohol pre-ban (top 50% and top
25% of households)—i.e. the subgroups of particular
policy relevance.
Effects on frequency of purchasing and quantity of
alcohol purchased per trip
We further investigated the purchasing patterns for the
four alcohol categories for (i) the frequency of shopping
trips involving purchases; (ii) the number of products
purchased per trip; (iii) the volume (in ml or pure alcohol
units) purchased per trip; and (iv) the mean size of the
products purchased. In what follows, we use ‘product’ to
refer to the Stock Keeping Unit, i.e. a pack containing
multiple beer bottles would be defined as one product.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and results of the
difference-in-differences estimation for alcohol purchased
per quarter for the four alcohol categories and for total
volume of pure alcohol.
The log-scaled volume of alcohol purchased is pre-
sented separately for Scottish and English and Welsh
households in the pre- and post-ban periods. In panel A of
Table 1 we present the main difference-in-differences
results. The volume of alcohol purchased in the post-ban
period is generally larger than in the pre-ban period both
in Scotland and in England and Wales. This reflects high
volumes of alcohol purchased during the Christmas
period. Panel B of Table 1 shows the robustness check
using the data from the preceding year, when the banwas
not implemented and for which no ‘effect’ is expected.
Comparing volume of alcohol purchased between
January 2010 and June 2011 (panel B) to purchases
from January 2011 to June 2012 (panel A), there was a
general decline in purchasing both in Scotland and in
England and Wales.
In panel A of Table 1, which shows the main analysis,
there was no significant effect of the ban on volume of
alcohol purchased apart from spirits, which showed a sta-
tistically significant decline of 6.57% [point estimate:
−0.068, 95% confidence interval (CI) = −0.132 to
−0.004, equivalent to −80.6 ml per quarter]. However, in
panel B (using equivalent data from the previous year),
spirits again showed a statistically significant decline in
560 Ryota Nakamura et al.
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the absence of any ban, indicating differences in baseline
time trends between Scotland and England and Wales.
When this difference is taken into account, as shown in
the final row of Table 1, there is no longer any significant
effect of the ban on spirit purchases. Trends in patterns of
purchasing are illustrated in Fig. 1.
The main results are unaffected by either socio-
economic status or the volume of alcohol purchased pre-
ban, except for the two cases in which purchases of spirits
for themiddle socio-economic group decreased by 7.36%,
and total pure alcohol for households purchasing the
most alcohol pre-ban (top quartile) increased by 6.6% in
Scotland (Supporting information Table S3-1). However,
again the robustness check (difference-in-difference-in-
differences analysis) (Supporting information Table S3-2
and S3-3) suggests that these effects found in the main
analysis may be spurious.
Effects on frequency of purchasing and quantity of
alcohol purchased per trip
We analysed purchasing patterns for the four alcohol cat-
egories using additional outcome variables: (i) frequency
of shopping trips involving any purchases from the cat-
egory per quarter; (ii) number of products purchased
from the category per trip; (iii) volume of purchasing
from the category per trip (in ml); and (iv) average size of
products purchased (in ml). These results are shown in
Supporting information Table S4-1.
The average frequency of shopping trips involving
beer and cider increased by 9.2% (P < 0.01) in Scotland
post-ban compared to shopping patterns in England and
Wales (equivalent to 0.13 more trips per quarter), with
no significant change for the other alcohol categories.
Fewer products per trip were purchased following the ban
for beer and cider, for wine and for spirits. For beer and
cider, the significant reduction is 8.1% (equivalent to
0.15 fewer products per trip). However, the effects for
wine and spirits were not robust to different model speci-
fications (Supporting informationTable S4-2). The size of
the effects for beer and cider were more pronounced for
less advantaged socio-economic groups (see Supporting
information Table S4-3).
Robustness checks and a supplementary analysis
We conducted several additional robustness checks and a
supplementary analysis, as follows:
1 Panel difference-in-differences regressions: the same
data were used as in Table 1, but disaggregated into
quarterly time-periods. This allows more flexible
modelling with additional time-varying control vari-
ables, including seasonal variables such as tempera-
ture and regional unemployment (see Supporting
information—section 6 and Table S5).
2 Analysis using a different sample window: in the
main analysis, the pre-ban period (January 2011–
September 2011) and the post-ban period (October
2011–June 2012) cover different months of the year.
We implemented another difference-in-differences
analysis using a different sample window, with the pre-
ban period ranging from October 2010 to June 2011,
and post-ban from October 2011 to June 2012 (see
Supporting information Table S6).
3 Excluding shopping over the Christmas period (defined
here as the whole of December): this period could
potentially show different trends in Scotland compared
to England and Wales, thereby distorting our main
results (see Fig. 1, Supporting information Fig. S3 and
Table S7).
None of these analyses affected the main results or con-
clusions of the principal analysis.
4 Analysis of potential differential effects of the multi-
buy ban in terms of quality of products, by looking at
the effects separately by branded products and super-
market own-label products. The results showed that
the ban of multi-buys did not significantly increase or
decrease the volume of alcohol from branded products,
nor own-label products (see Supporting information
Table S8).
DISCUSSION
Our results from both main and subgroup analyses show
that in the short term—i.e. 9months post-intervention—
the ban on multi-buys in Scotland has failed to impact
upon the volume of alcohol purchased. These findings
are broadly in line with those from a recent descriptive
analysis published in a Scottish NHS report [31]. The
report presented a before-and-after comparison of total
sales volume of alcohol, finding no decline inweekly sales
volume of pure alcohol and separate analyses of beer,
wine and spirits in Scotland. We confirm these results
based on a more extensive statistical analysis and using a
different data set to examine whether purchases of
alcohol at the household level (rather than aggregated
sales figures) have been affected by the ban.
We examined three hypotheses that may explain the
lack of effect of the multi-buy ban:
1 Scottish stores did not comply with the legislation.
This is unlikely, and it was rejected following direct
observations of selected stores (see Supporting infor-
mation section 11).
2 Scottish households circumvented the ban by online
and/or cross-border shopping.
This hypothesis was also rejected. First, the proportion
of online purchasing in the data is small, and exclud-
ing online purchases does not affect the results sub-
stantially (see Supporting information Table S7). As for
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cross-border purchasing, excluding households located
on the border between England and Scotland did not
alter the main results (see Supporting information
Table S7).
3 Deals that were multi-buys in England andWales were
run as temporary price reductions in Scottish stores
(Kantar WorldPanel, personal communication; also
see Supporting information section 11 for photo-
graphs of shelves of beer products in selected super-
markets), so it became possible to buy alcohol at the
same discount as in the multi-buy deals but for smaller
financial outlays, i.e. making the deal affordable to a
wider range of the population.
Most large-scale stores in the United Kingdom operate a
national pricing policy, which seeks to equate the prices
paid in Scotland and England and Wales [32]. Therefore,
the response to themulti-buy ban of some in the industry
is likely to have been the replacement of multi-buy pro-
motions with temporary price reductions; for example,
replacing a buy-one-get-one-free offer with a simple
50% off, in order to maintain the same price per pro-
duct (Kantar WorldPanel, personal communication). In
further support of this hypothesis, a recent submission to
the UK House of Commons Health Committee by the
Association of Convenience Stores [33] states that: ‘expe-
rience from Scotland shows that restricting promotions
can actually make alcohol more affordable for problem
drinkers. For example, rather than a person needing £12
to buy three bottles of wine, they can buy one for £4,
when the actual single unit cost would have been £5’.
Our results provide additional support for this hypothesis,
as households appear to have responded to the ban by
purchasing beer or cider products on more occasions
but buying fewer products per trip.
While we tested extensively the robustness of our find-
ings, there are threemain limitations to the analysis: first,
as the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act (2010) also included
restrictions on in-store marketing of alcohol products
and a revised age verification policy, it is impossible to
isolate the independent effects of the multi-buy ban.
However, excluding data from younger households
(i.e. main shopper aged 30 years or less), the main results
were largely maintained (Supporting information
Table S7), suggesting that the new age-verification policy
was unlikely to account for the lack of effect of the multi-
buy ban. Moreover, these accompanying regulations
were also intended to decrease alcohol purchases and
we found no such decrease.
Secondly, this evaluation focuses on the short-term
(i.e. 9months) impact of themulti-buy ban on purchases.
As more data become available, a longer-term evaluation
on alcohol consumption and its health effects would be
desirable. Furthermore, the current policy is meant to be
combined with more direct minimum unit pricing regu-
lation, following recent Scottish legislation [34]. We
cannot exclude the possibility that the effect of the ban
will materialize once it is part of a broader policy mix.
Thirdly, although the underlying data set is a high-
quality, actively maintained commercial data set, there
are limitations in the data itself that need to be borne in
mind when interpreting the results. Most notably, the
data consist of take-home purchases from off-trade stores
only, and therefore purchases of alcohol at bars and res-
taurants, which account for about one-third of the total
alcohol market [15], are not included in the data. Moreo-
ver, the purchasing data are self-reported and may there-
fore be subject to bias and under-reporting. It is also
conceivable that due to recruitment problems the high
end of very harmful alcohol consumers is not part of
the sample.
Mindful of these limitations, our findings represent an
important contribution to public health research as well
as to policy. In terms of the former, the study adds to the
few existing ‘natural experiment’ evaluations of actual
policy interventions—an area that was singled out in the
recent Medical Research Council (MRC) Guidance as a
key priority for public health research [35], given the dif-
ficulty of evaluating population-level interventions in
randomized controlled trials. The existing literature of
relevant alcohol policy appraisal has been based upon
ex-ante demand–response simulations via mathematical
or statistical modelling [36,37]. Although those models
are an essential input to the examination of policy sce-
narios, they tend to ignore any potential compensatory
supply responses by the industry to the legislation in
question, and thus may be prone to overly optimistic
predictions [18]. Our ex-post analysis complements the
existing modelling approaches by providing a direct
evaluation of the actual policy, capturing the net effect
of all demand and supply responses that result upon the
introduction of the policy.
In terms of policy, the results should inform
policymakers who are considering enacting similar
alcohol policies nationally and internationally. Thus far,
at least in Europe, the most frequent price intervention in
the alcohol market has been that of imposing excise
duties on alcoholic beverages [38]. However, there appear
to be limits in the form of political and public acceptabil-
ity regarding further extension of these measures [39].
There is reason to believe that countries may be seeking
other, less contentious pricing policies—a characteristic
that would arguably be met by the restriction of quantity
discounts. However, our findings suggest that while this
policy may be politically more feasible, it appears ineffec-
tive, at least in the short term. In practice, future policy
design should seek to factor in potential supply-side
responses that could mitigate the intended effect of the
policy. In the case of the multi-buy ban examined here,
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retailers appear to have responded by simply replacing
multi-buys with simple price reduction. Banning all
forms of price promotion of alcohol may be considered a
more effective option [36], yet such a policy may still be
compromised by reductions in the standard price of
alcohol products, thereby making alcohol more afford-
able. More encompassing regulation of price promotion
and price is probably required in order to reduce alcohol
purchasing and, in turn, consumption and related
harms.
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Supporting information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the
online version of this article at the publisher’s web-site:
Figure S1 Kernel density plot of the raw volume of
alcohol purchased per quarter
Figure S2 Kernel density plot of the log-scaled volume of
alcohol purchased per quarter
Figure S3 Time trends in alcohol purchasing excluding
Christmas (January 2010–June 2012) (comparable
figure including Christmas is Fig. 1 in the main paper)
Table S1-1 Total volume of alcohol purchased in
Scotland from January 2011 to September 2011 (pre-
ban period only) by promotional category (Kantar
WorldPanel data).
Table S1-2 Total volume of alcohol purchased in
England and Wales from January 2011 to June 2012
(pre-ban and post-ban periods) by promotional category
(Kantar WorldPanel data).
Table S2-1 Mean volume of beer and cider purchased by
households pre- and post-ban (volume per quarter),
by household purchasing patterns.
Table S2-2 Mean volume of wine purchased by
households pre- and post-ban (volume per quarter), by
household purchasing patterns.
Table S2-3 Mean volume of spirits purchased by house-
holds pre- and post-ban (volume per quarter), by
household purchasing patterns.
Table S2-4 Mean volume of flavoured alcoholic bever-
ages (FABs) purchased by households pre- and post-
ban (volume per quarter), by household purchasing
patterns.
Table S2-5 Mean total pure alcohol (measured by units)
purchased by households pre- and post-ban (units per
quarter), by household purchasing patterns.
Table S3-1 Difference-in-differences estimation of the
impact of the multi-buy ban on the volume of alcohol
purchased per quarter in Scotland by (a) socio-economic
group and (b) volume of alcohol purchased pre-ban.
Table S3-2 Difference-in-difference-in-differences esti-
mates of the impact of the multi-buy ban on volume of
alcohol purchased per quarter in Scotland by (a) socio-
economic group and (b) volume of alcohol purchased
pre-ban (difference-in-difference-in-differences version
of Table S3-1).
Table S3-3 Sensitivity analyses of the results of
Table S3-1 and S3-2 (using different cut-off values for
volume of alcohol purchased pre-ban: top 50, 33, 25, 20
and 5%).
Table S4-1 Difference-in-differences estimates of the
impact of the multi-buy ban on (i) the frequency of trips
involving alcohol purchasing per quarter, (ii) the number
of alcohol products purchased per trip, (iii) the volume of
alcohol purchased (in natural volume, ml) per trip and
(iv) the average size of alcohol products (in natural
volume, ml).
Table S4-2 Difference-in-difference-in-differences esti-
mates of the impact of the multi-buy ban on (i) the fre-
quency of trips involving alcohol purchasing per quarter,
(ii) the number of alcohol products purchased per trip,
(iii) the volume of alcohol purchased per trip (in natural
volume, ml) and (iv) the average size of alcohol products
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(in natural volume, ml) [difference-in-difference-in-
differences version of Table S4-1).
Table S4-3-1 Subsample analysis for the impact of the
multi-buy ban on (i) the frequency of trips involving
alcohol purchasing per quarter in Scotland (inTable S4-1
and S4-2), by (a) socio-economic group and (b) volume
of alcohol purchased pre-ban.
Table S4-3-2 Subsample analysis for the impact of the
multi-buy ban on (ii) the number of alcohol products
purchased per trip in Scotland (in Table S4-1 and S4-2),
by (a) socio-economic group and (b) volume of alcohol
purchased pre-ban.
Table S4-3-3 Subsample analysis for the impact of the
multi-buy ban on (iii) the volume of alcohol purchased
per trip (in natural volume, ml) in Scotland (inTable S4-1
and S4-2), by (a) socio-economic group and (b) volume of
alcohol purchased pre-ban.
Table S4-3-4 Subsample analysis for the impact of the
multi-buy ban on (iv) the average size of alcohol products
(in natural volume, ml) in Scotland (in Table S4-1 and
S4-2), by (a) socio-economic group and (b) volume of
alcohol purchased pre-ban.
Table S5 Panel difference-in-differences estimates.
Table S6 Difference-in-differences using different sample
window (pre-ban: October 2010–June 2011; post-ban:
October 2011–June 2012).
Table S7 Subsample analyses of difference-in-
difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of
the ban on alcohol volume purchased (point estimate
only)—(i) excluding purchases made during Christmas;
(ii) excluding purchases made online; (iii) excluding
households located near the border; and (iv) excluding
households with a main shopper aged 30 years or
younger.)
Table S8 Difference-in-difference-in-differences esti-
mates of the impact of the multi-buy ban on volume of
alcohol purchased per quarter in Scotland, separately by
branded products and supermarket own-label products.
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